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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

IRA K, HEARN, JR.,
Peri rioner,
Case No. 14269
UTAH LIQUOR CONTROL
COMMISSION,
Respondent.

PETITIONER'S BRIEF
:f:

"4< :f:

:=§:

::>[c

NATURE OF THE CASE
' I his is a petition foi review' of the decision of the t Jtali
Liquor Control Commission issued September 3, 1975, and
predicated on a hearing held on August 22, °

'>, dismissing

the Petitioner as Hi rector of the Utah Liquor Control Commissioi i
The petition is filed under the provisions of §32-1-32.6, UCA
1953, as amended.
DISPOSITION BY THE
UTAH LIQUOR CONTROL COMMISSION
Following the hearing on August 22, 1975, the Utali
I ,iquoi Coiiti ol Commission issued its order dated September 3,
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1975, removing and dismissing Petitioner as Director of the
Utah Liquor Control Commission, effective as of said September 3,
1975.
RELIEF SOUGHT BY PETITION FOR REVIEW
Petitioner seeks a reversal of the decision of the Utah
Liquor Control Commission and the reinstatement of Petitioner
as Director of said Commission.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Petitioner has set forth in detail the nature of the proceeding for which review and reversal is sought by this petition in his
Petition for Review served and filed with this Honorable Court on
September 25, 1975. Thereafter, by order of this Honorable
Court, dated November 5, 1975, pursuant to stipulation of counsel,
Petitioner was granted to and including the first day of December,
1975, in which to file Petitioner's Brief in support of his Petition
for Review.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT
THE HEARING BEFORE THE UTAH
LIQUOR CONTROL COMMISSION
ON AUGUST 22, 1975 DID NOT
CONSTITUTE "CAUSE" FOR REMOVAL
FROM OFFICE AS REQUIRED BY
SECTION 32-1-5.5(3), UCA 1953,
AS AMENDED BY CHAPTER 90
LAWS OF UTAH 1975
-2-
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The applicable statute, §32-1-5.5(3), UCA 1953, as
amended by Chapter 90 Laws of Utah 1975, provides that the
Director of the Utah Liquor Control Commission Mmay only
be removed from office for cause after a public hearing by a
majority vote of the Commission/'
By letter dated August 14, 1975, the Utah Liquor Control
Commission notified the Petitioner that a hearing would be held
on the 22nd day of August, 1975, to determine whether or not
the Commission should remove Petitioner as Director of the
Utah Liquor Control Commission. By that letter, the Commission stated its "cause" for its intended removal of the Director
as follows:
"It is the opinion of the Commission that
difficulties have arisen over the last six months
between the Director of the Utah Liquor Control
Commission and the Commission members. It
is the Commission's opinion that these difficulties
prevent us from working amicably and cohesively
with you as Director of the Utah Liquor Control
Commission. Because of this, we feel that the
Commission's business is not being carried out
in a cooperative manner nor with a singleness of
purpose."
By letter of August 19, 1975, directed to Robert B. Hansen,
Deputy Attorney General of the State of Utah, then acting counsel
for Petitioner, the Utah Liquor Control Commission submitted an
additional alleged "cause" for removal by stating that, " . . .we feel
-3Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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there has been a general deterioration of communication and
direction between the Commission and Director which leaves
the Commission with no confidence in the Director."
At the hearing on August 22, 1975, the Chairman of
the Utah Liquor Control Commission, Gerald E. Hulbert, and
the Commissioners, Herbert J. Corkey, Jr. and Ernest F .
Durbano, without being sworn, testified as to the Commission's purported "cause" for Petitioner's removal. The said
"causes" testified to by the Chairman and Commissioners are
set forth in detail on pages 10 through 22 of Petitioner's Petition
for Review on file herein, together with Petitioner's response
to each said "cause" or charge for removal. These purported
"causes" for removal so testified to may be summarized as follows:
(1)

Alleged insubordination and lack of loyalty to

the principles of law.
(2)

Unauthorized signing by Petitioner of the employ-

ment contract with Mr. Thomas H. Kemp.
(3)

Petitioner's report to the Commission, as r e -

quested, concerning a cost study as to the data input system.
(4)

Petitioner's letter of April 17, 1975, to Governor

Calvin L. Rampton complaining that the Commission evidently
-4Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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had no intention of following the Governor's outline (guidelines)
as to respective duties of the Commissioners and the Director.
(5)

Reports of shortages in various stores of the Utah

Liquor Control Commission during the months of February-April,
1975.
(6)
TT

Commissioner Corkey's opinion that Petitioner's

.. .day-to-day direction had not been what it should be or we

would not have the morale problem referred t o . "
(7)

Petitioner's alleged desire to change the system

of government from a commission to a directorship.
It will be noted that the testimony of the Chairman and
Commissioners was not responsive to the broad charges of cause
for dismissal set forth in the Commission's letters of August 14,
1975 and August 19, 1975.
Following the hearing, and by its letter of September 3,
1975, the Utah Liquor Control Commission made findings of fact.
Only five of the findings can be identified as relating to the alleged
causes for dismissal testified to by the Commissioners at the
hearing on August 22, 1975. They a r e as follows:
Finding #1:

Responds to number four above that Petitioner

directed a letter dated April 17, 1975, to Governor Rampton complaining that the Commission evidently had no intention of following
-5Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the Governor's written guidelines concerning the respective
duties of the Commissioners and the Director.
Finding #2:

Responds to number two above concern-

ing Petitioner's alleged unauthorized signing of the employment
contract with Thomas H. Kemp.
Findings #5 and #10:

Respond to number four above

concerning Petitioner's recommendations as to in-house key
taping procedure.
Finding #6:

Responds to number seven above con-

cerning Petitioner's expressed desire to change the administration from a full time commission to a part-time commission and full time directorship.
These five findings do relate to the alleged causes for
dismissal testified to by the Chairman and Commissioners,
However, they are not responsive to the grounds for removal
or dismissal set forth in the Commission's letters of August
14, 1975 and August 19, 1975, which are limited to alleged
general "difficulties" between the Director and the Commission,
and a "general deterioration of communication between the
Commission and Director which leaves the Commission with
no confidence in the Director."
The remaining eight findings are neither supported by

-6Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the charges of causes stated in the letters of August 14, 1975
and August 19, 1975, nor are they responsive to the testimony
of the Commissioners. Rather, they relate to new and extraneous matters developed in testimony and documents introduced
for the first time at the hearing, as follows:
Finding #3:

Failure to route to the Commission

Governor RamptonTs letter requesting information to assist in
responding to Richard B. Kinnersley's letter of August 5, 1975.
Finding #4:

Petitioner's letter of March 5, 1975, con-

cerning a proposed pay increase for Clara Pratt.
Finding #8:

Petitioner's alleged refusal on August 18,

1975, to sign a personnel action form.
Findings #7, #9, #11, #12 and #13:

These findings

apparently complain of Ma difference of management philosophy'
and conflicts in the interpretation of the allocation of duties and
responsibilities of the Director and Commissioners as outlined
by Governor Rampton's written guidelines of January 20, 1975,
and as set forth in Chapter 90 Laws of Utah 1975, which became
effective March 13, 1975.
Petitioner's response to these additional findings and his
reference to the supporting record are fully set forth in Petitioner's
Petition for Review on file herein.
-7Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Since these additional findings were not supported by the
testimony of the Chairman or Commissioners nor by charges
set forth in their letters of August 14, 1975 and August 19, 1975,
Petitioner respectfully submits that he had no opportunity to explain or rebut the additional charges contained in the said findings,
and they are unavailable to support the alleged basis for his dismissal.
It may well be that the failure of the letters of August 14,
1975 and August 19, 1975 to set forth in detail or with sufficient
particularity the alleged causes for Petitioner's dismissal renders
it unnecessary for this Court to consider the purported evidence
allegedly supporting his dismissal.
The law as to this point is set forth in State ex rel Hart v.
Common Council of Duluth, decided by the Supreme Court of
Minnesota on May 9, 1893, and reported at 55 N.W. 118, 121.
There, the Court stated MSince none of the charges relied on are
sufficient in law . . . this renders it unnecessary to consider the
evidence at all."
The law as to what constitutes cause for removal of a
public officer where

TT

causeM for removal is required by statute,

is most cogently set forth in the 1951 decision of the Supreme
Court of Utah in Taylor v. Lee, 119 Utah 302, 226 P2d 531. In
-8Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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that case, Justice Latimer, speaking for an undivided Court, stated:
"The reason for throwing this cloak of protection around an office-holder is to assure to him
the right granted by the statute; namely, that he
shall be removed for cause only and not for political
or trifling r e a s o n s . . . . Removing for cause takes
a form of punishment, it infers that the office-holder
has failed to perform his duties or was incompetent
or unsuitable for the position to which he was appointed
and directly reflects upon his official or personal
qualifications
Cognizance should be taken
of the fact that he who originally hears the charges
has, in most instances, already arrived at a decision
to remove, and, as a consequence, the original
hearing is before one who lacks the impartiality
of a disinterested judge.tT
The Court continues (226 P2d 540) M .. .the Governor should
not remove an officer, which act carries with it the possible ruination of the man removed, until and unless there is some showing by
misconduct or otherwise that he does not possess the qualifications,
fitness and ability to perform the duties of his office

M

Here, as in the Taylor case, there having been no contention that Petitioner was guilty of fraud or dishonesty in connection
with any of the transactions referred to,

M

this admission limits the

issues largely to the question of incompetency or inefficiency on
the part of the plaintiff

We believe that before casting a

shadow on a man's character or his capacity to hold office, a
showing of unfitness is required

We believe removal from

a position of honor and trust for cause is a harsh remedy which
-9Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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should be limited to cases where the evidence reasonably establishes that the office-holder failed to meet the ordinary standards
of competency and efficiency/'
Mr. Justice Crockett in State v. Jones, 17 Utah 2d 190,
407 P2d 571, had occasion to reverse the dismissal of the County
Auditor of Salt Lake County under §77-7-1, UCA 1953, which provided for removal for high crimes, misdemeanors or malfeasance
in office. In that case, Mr. Justice Crockett, speaking for an undivided Court, stated, "These statutes are not of common law
origin, but are creatures of legislative enactment, and due to
the seriousness of their consequences, both to the individual in
the forfeiture of his office, and as an intervention in the process
of democracy, proceedings under them are properly regarded as
quasi-criminal in nature. Accordingly, the statute should be
strictly construed against the authority invoking it and liberally
in favor of the one against whom it is asserted. M
The general rule is stated at 67 Corpus Juris Secundum
§60 page 248 as follows:
M

The cause must be one which specially relates
to and affects the administration of the office, and
must be restricted to something of a substantial nature
directly affecting the rights and interests of the public.
An officer should not be removed from office on trivial
or inconsequential matters, or for mere technical violations of statute or official duty without wrongful intention. The entire record of the employee sought to
-10Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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be discharged, including that prior to the time
the administrative official took office, is r e viewable in determining whether just cause
exists for the discharge of the employee."
Justice Larson, in a dissenting opinion, in State ex rel
Hammond v. Maxfield, 103 Utah 1, 43, 132 P2d 660, quotes with
approval from Mecham on Public Officers as follows:
"Section 452: Authority to remove for cause
cannot be construed as an implied authority to
remove at pleasure."
It is respectfully submitted that a review of the record as
set forth in the Petition for Review and attachments thereto must
leave the Court with an understanding that in the case at bar
Petitioner's removal was without cause and solely for trivial
and inconsequential matters strictly of a political nature and
reflecting no stigma as to the competence or willingness of the
Petitioner to perform his duties.
Testing the initial charges of "cause" against the accepted
legal interpretations of that term, it is apparent that "difficulties"
and "lack of communication" do not measure up to "cause" for
dismissal. There is not a public officer alive who could not be
discharged "for cause" if "difficulties" and "lack of communication"
were sufficient grounds to make out "cause."
Considering the testimony of the Chairman and Commissioners and testing their unsworn statements against statutory
-11Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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"cause", several preliminary circumstances call attention to
themselves.
First, the three witnesses rely upon widely differing
grounds. One, the Chairman, Mr. Hulbert, speaks of insubordination and lack of loyalty to principles of law (whatever that
may have meant to the witness). He also complains of Petitioner's
allegedly unauthorized signing of an employment contract with
Mr. Kemp, and finishes by referring to his disagreement with
Petitioner's written report, as requested, giving his judgment as
to the relative undesirability of engaging an outside firm to do the
data input or key taping operations against continued use of inhouse personnel. The second, Commissioner Corkey, complains
that Petitioner wrote the Governor reporting that the carefully
worked out guidelines as to the respective duties of the Commissioners and Director were not being followed. He also complains vaguely of newly emerging reports showing shortages in
various stores revealed by the new accounting system initiated
by Petitioner. The third, Commissioner Durbano, complains
that Petitioner has different views from the Commissioners as
to an efficient organizational structure for the Commission.
One would think that if any specific incompetence or misconduct justified dismissal, the three members might agree in

-12Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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focusing on such cause in their testimony. Rather, they seem
to be searching about for

M

causetT hoping to find some peg upon

which to hang their decision.
Second, the proliferation and multiplicity of alleged
"causes" and the willingness of the Commissioners to shift their
ground from their initial charges, to their statements at the
hearing, and finally, to the widely differing grounds set forth
in their

M

findingstT, suggests the shallowness of their position.

It demonstrates that the causes testified to and relied on are
really afterthoughts dredged up to justify a decision already
arrived at for other r e a s o n s .
Certainly Mr. Hearn was not dismissed because he m i s takenly failed to route the Governor's letter from M r . Kinnersley
to the Commissioners. Nor was he discharged because his
report and recommendations as to in-house key taping differed
with what the Commissioners wanted to hear. Nor could M r .
Hearn's firing have resulted from his signing the employment
contract with Mr. Kemp after the Commission obtained the funds
it requested for this purpose, the employee had been cleared, and
the contract had been approved as to form for the Director's
signature by the very counsel who now represents the Commission. Nor could the Commission really complain that M r .
Hearn felt obliged to let the Governor know that the guidelines
-13-
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so carefully worked out by the Governor personally were not
being applied or followed by the Commission notwithstanding
the Commission's prior approval.
The real reason for Petitioner's dismissal, and the
"cause", if any exists, lies more in the area of "difference
of management philosophy", differing opinions as to the allocation of duties between the Commissioners and the Director
spelled out by the Governor's guidelines of January 20, 1975,
and later by the legislature's adoption of substantially the same
allocations in Chapter 90, Laws of Utah 1975. More specifically, the real cause must be found in Petitioner's statements
to the Citizens Council and to Commissioner Durbano that he
favored a part-time Commission and a full time Director. This
is the insubordination and lack of loyalty to principles of law
referred to without further specification by Chairman Hulbert.
This is the so-called lack of loyalty to the "Commission" complained of in Finding #9. It forms the underlying basis for
Findings #12 and #13.
The issue as to allocation of duties and organizational
structure of the Utah Liquor Control Commission had been prominently brought to the attention of the Legislature, the Commission, the Governor and the Citizens Council long before the

-14Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Petitioner was asked to give his views to the Citizens Council.
Having served as Commissioner and then as Director, Mr.
Hearn had desirable background from which to express a qualified opinion and judgment. The issue was very much in the
public eye and was of considerable interest to the public. Mr.
Hearn had as much right to express his view that a part-time
Commission and full time Director was more desirable as did
the Commissioners that they preferred a full time Commission.
If the issue had not been mandated for study by the Governor and
Legislature, Mr. Hearn's expression of his views might have
seemed somewhat presumptuous. Under the existing circumstances, it was an honest and qualified expression of a conviction deeply held, an exercise of freedom of speech, and does
not constitute cause for dismissal even though the Commissioners
held differing views in their own interests. Furthermore, Mr.
Hearn's views as to the allocation of general policy-making to
the Commissioners and day-to-day administration and direction
to the Director, was consistent both with the views of the Governor
and of the Legislature. His opinion that three full time Commissioners were neither necessary nor desirable for the formulation
of policy and tended to provoke conflict and controversy in day-today administration was sound, qualified, and in the best interests
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of sound public administration of the agency. Surely, his courage
in expressing these views does not constitute a lawful "cause" for
his dismissal. His views are more in the area of differing political views which should be encouraged rather than punished.
There are a number of decisions of the Supreme Court of
Utah which, though somewhat collateral, may be of some assistance to the Court: People v. McAllister, 10 Utah 357, 37 P 578;
Pratt v. Board of Police and Fire Commissioners, 15 Utah 1, 49
P 747; Heath v. Salt Lake City, 16 Utah 374, 52 P 602; Pratt v.
Swan, 16 Utah 483, 52 P 1092; Gilbert v. Board of Commissioners,
11 Utah 378, 40 P 264; Silvey v. Boyle, 20 Utah 205, 57 P 880;
State v. Beardsley, 13 Utah 502, 45 P 569; Taylor v. Gunderson,
107 Utah 437, 154 P 2d 653; Sheriff of Salt Lake County v. Board
of Commissioners, 71 Utah 593, 268 P 783; Everill v. Swan, 17
Utah 514, 55 P 68; State ex rel Hammond v. Maxfield, 103 Utah 1,
132 P 2d 660. See also State v. Board of Regents of University of
Nevada, 269 P 2d 265; Sausbier v. Wheeler, (1937) 299 New York
Supp. 466; and the exhaustive annotation at 99 ALR 336-405.
POINT II

'

THE UTAH LIQUOR CONTROL
COMMISSION DID NOT REGULARLY PURSUE ITS AUTHORITY
IN PROVIDING OR CONDUCTING
A "PUBLIC HEARING" AS REQUIRED
BY SECTION 32-1-5.5(3), UCA 1953
AS AMENDED BY CHAPTER 90 LAWS
OF UTAH 1975
-16-
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Petitioner has carefully pointed out some fourteen procedural errors which he claims were committed by the Commission in providing and conducting the "public hearing" r e quired by law for consideration of the evidence of "cause" for
his dismissal. Without waiving or abandoning any of these
alleged procedural errors, this brief will only attempt to review
the applicable case law generally with respect to the procedural requirements for such a hearing and specifically the
case law with respect to two alleged errors; namely, failure
to give due notice concerning the grounds or "causes" for dismissal, and the denial of the right to cross examine the witnesses
offered against Petitioner.
Justice Bartch had the opportunity, at the turn of the
century, to pass on a series of official removal cases before
the Supreme Court of Utah. Perhaps his classic decision is
that of People v. McAllister, decided July 27, 1894 and reported
at 10 Utah 357, 37 P 578. At 10 Utah 372, Justice Bartch states:
"The conditions of removal are express, and
clearly set forth in the statutes, and cannot be disregarded as immaterial. A removal for cause is a
judicial act which affects the reputation and rights
of the accused. It is in law a punishment for crime,
and the proceeding provided by statute can no more
be dispensed with in such a case than a court can
disregard the statutory provisions in the trial of a
cause where a person is charged with the commission of an offense. From an examination of the
history of judicial proceedings, it will be seen that
officers clothed with the power of removal for cause
-17-
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have frequently attempted its exercise at pleasure, ex parte, and such examination will also
TT
show how futile have been their efforts
"The proceeding being thus a judicial one, the
power must be exercised under the same limitations, precautions, and sanctions as in any
other judicial proceedings."
In Taylor v. Lee, decided January 13, 1951, 119 Utah 302,
226 P2d 531, Justice Latimer addressed himself generally to the
procedural requirements for removal of an office-holder for cause
and cites Bodmer v. Police Mutual Aid Association, 94 Utah 450, 78
P2d 640. He states the minimum requirements to be as follows:
"(1) A written notice of the nature of the
charges couched in ordinary and understandable
language; (2) a notice of the time and place of
hearing; (3) an opportunity by the office-holder
to be heard and answer the charges; (4) the right
to be represented by counsel, with opportunity for
cross examination; and (5) the presence of a r e porter to preserve the testimony so that, if necessary, the question of cause can be made the subj ect of j udicial review
In For man v. Creighton School District No. 14, 87 Arizona
329, 351 P2d 165, the Court cites Taylor v. Lee and states the r e quirements for procedural due process in a removal hearing before
the Board of Trustees of the School District.
In Napuche v. Liquor Control Commission, decided by the
Supreme Court of Michigan on April 13, 1953, 336 Michigan 398,
i -

58 N.W. 2d 118, the Court reviews and restates the necessary
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procedural requirements and quotes the following from Morgan
v. United States, 304 U . S . 1, 82 L. Ed. 1129:
M

The maintenance of proper standards on the
p a r t of administrative agencies in the performance
of their quasi-judicial functions is of the highest
importance and in no way cripples or e m b a r r a s s e s
the exercise of their appropriate authority. On the
contrary, it is in their manifest interest. F o r , as
we said at the outset, if these multiplying agencies
seemed to be necessary in our complex society a r e
to serve the purposes for which they a r e created
and endowed with vast powers, they must accredit
themselves by acting in accordance with the cherished judicial tradition embodying the basic concepts of fair play."
The Michigan Court then proceeds to list and itemize the p r o c e dural rights to which the person charged in at least en tided and
quotes approvingly from Hanson v. Michigan State Board of Registration in Medicine, 253 Michigan 601, 236 N.W. 225, 228.
The case of Friedman v. State of New York decided April
23, 1969, 24 N.Y. 2d 528, 301 N . Y . S . 2d 484 not only goes to the
issue as to McauseM but states the requirements for proper p r o c e dure and questions the combining of the functions of complainant,
prosecutor and judge. Further as to the question whether p r o c e dural due process requires the disqualification of an outspoken
and antagonistic opponent, see Acierno v. Folsom, Supreme Court
of Delaware (1975) 337 Atlantic 2d 309. This decision cites and
relies on Kennecott Copper Corporation v. F . T . C. (Tenth Circuit)
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467 F . 2d 67, 80 (1972). In Taylor v. Lee, 226 P2d 53, 538,
the Court notes that where the Governor is the removing officer,

M

there is no apparent reason why the Governor should

not appoint a referee to hear the evidence and make recommended findings.M Section 32-1-32.2 UCA 1953 makes express
provision for use of hearing officers by the Utah Liquor Control Commission. Surely both the appearance and substance
of due process and impartial procedure would have suggested
recourse to such a hearing officer here where the Commissioners were required to pass on their own statements as
alleged cause for dismissal.
. , The law as to Petitioner's right to written notice of the
charges against him constituting cause for removal is concisely
y

stated Taylor v. Lee, 226P2d531, 538, as follows: " . . . t h e
minimum requirements are these: (1) A written notice of the
nature of the charges couched in ordinary and understandable
language." It may be that vague references to "difficulties"between the Commissioners and the Petitioner is "ordinary"
language, but it certainly is not "understandable" to one who
is obliged to prepare a defense to such a charge. Nor was the
specification of "charges" improved by the second letter from
the Commission on August 19, 1975, three days prior to the
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scheduled hearing, where reference is made to a feeling of
''general deterioration of communication and direction between
the Commission and Director which leaves the Commission
with no confidence in the Director".
Justice Bartch is even more specific as to the requirement for notice of the charges against the challenged officer.
People v. McAllister, 10 Utah 357, 375, 37 P 357, quotes
favorably from Dullam v. Wilson, 53 Michigan 392, 19 N.W.
112, as follows: "There must be charges specifying the particulars in which the officer is subject to removal. It is not
sufficient to follow the language of the constitution. The officer is entitled to know the particular acts of neglect of duty,
or corrupt conduct, or other act relied upon as constituting
malfeasance or misfeasance in office; and he is entitled to a
reasonable notice of the time and place when and where an
opportunity will be given him for a hearing, and he has a
right to produce proof upon such hearing." Petitioner was
handed the letter of August 14, 1975 just eight days before the
hearing scheduled for August 22, 1975, the supplemental statement of written charges was dated August 19, 1975, and when
counsel for Petitioner asked for time to prepare his defense
at the close of the Commissioners' statements, he was given
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ten minutes and no more.

v

i

There can be little doubt that Petitioner was denied
procedural due process and the quasi-judicial proceeding
mandated by law when, over objections of his counsel, he
was denied the opportunity to cross examine the Commissioners at the close of each Commissioner's unsworn statement.

:
Mr. Justice Latimer in Taylor v. Lee lists as the

fourth minimum requirement "the right to be represented
by counsel with opportunity for cross examination.Tt Justice
Bartch likens a removal hearing to the trial of a cause where
a person is charged with the commission of an offense. Surely
such a procedure requires an opportunity to cross examine
adverse witnesses even though they may not have been sworn.
People v. McAllister, supra at 10 Utah 357, 373.
Forman v. Creighton School District No. 14, 87 Arizona
329, 351 P2d 165, states:

M

The questions thus presented are as

follows: (1) Whether the order of the Board of Trustees which
issued pursuant to a hearing in which petition was denied the
right to cross examine witnesses appearing against her, denied
to her due process of the law

In connection with the first

question, our research indicates that the over-whelming weight
of authority holds that for an administrative body, conducting a
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quasi-judicial hearing, to preclude the individual concerned
from cross examining witnesses appearing against him, denies
him due process of law.M Citing Taylor v. Lee, supra.

The

Arizona Supreme Court goes on (351 P2d 165, 167) to state that
the person charged

TT

is at least entitled to

(4) The right

to cross examine the witnesses who testify against h i m . "
Friedman v. State, 24 N.Y. 2d 544, 301 N . Y . S . 484,
497, quotes Smith v. Illinois, 390 U . S . 129,19 L . Ed. 2d 956,
to the effect that

M

. . . the right of cross examination (is a)

fundamental right, the deprivation of which is e r r o r of the
first magnitude."
POINT III
THE DECISION OF THE UTAH LIQUOR
CONTROL COMMISSION ISSUED SEPTEMBER 3, 1975, REMOVING PETITIONER
AS DIRECTOR OF THE SAID COMMISSION
AND THE HEARING AND PROCEDURE BY
WHICH IT REACHED ITS DECISION VIOLATED THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
OF THE PETITIONER
It is unnecessary to a reversal of the order of the Utah
Liquor Control Commission that Petitioner also establish and
that he was deprived of procedural and substantive due process
and his right of freedom of speech. Probably those charges a r e
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more pertinent to an action for damages under the Federal Civil
Rights Act, 42 USCS Section 1983.
Nevertheless, it is noted in passing that Petitioner's r e moval resulted from his rightful expression of his views concerning the more efficient organization of the Commission, and that
he was removed without proof of lawful cause for removal as
required by statute; and that the procedural due process guaranteed
him by the state and federal constitutions and the state statute
concerning his tenure of office, was denied him.
Certainly the Commissioners acted under color of state
law in taking each of the steps which led to Petitioner's removal.
Whether Petitioner's right to damages under 42 USCS
1983 depends upon a disposition of this proceeding in this Court
favorable to Petitioner, is an issue yet to be determined by
another court.
CONCLUSION
The decision of the Utah Liquor Control Commission
dated September 3, 1975, dismissing Petitioner, Ira K. Hearn,
J r . , as Director of the Utah Liquor Control Commission should
be reversed with instructions to the Commission to immediately
reinstate Petitioner with full salary from September 3, 1975.
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DATED this 28th day of Nov

1975,
5I submitted,

D. Ray C|wen, Jr,
Attorney for Petitioner
Suite 564 Kennecott Building
Ten East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the
foregoing Brief of Petitioner, Ira K. Hearn, J r . , were duly
mailed to William Barrett, Esq., Assistant Attorney General,
State Capital, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84114^ by^first class mail,
postage prepaid, this 28th day of Nove
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